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• This brief discusses several policy options that could 
improve tax compliance and tax administration in 
Mandalay – helping the city to escape its low-tax and 
underfunded services trap. 
• Increasing the perceived benefits of paying tax – by 
communicating the link between tax and infrastructure 
– would likely encourage compliance, so long as the 
government can facilitate ease of payment through 
effective approaches to tax collection. 
• To be effective at using such policies, cities first need 
strong foundations for tax administration. In particular, 
Mandalay could look to update its systems for property 
identification and assessment. The brief suggests several 
different approaches to do this and their associated 
trade-offs.
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Introduction
The Mandalay City Development Committee (MCDC) of Myanmar has 
identified property tax compliance as a key opportunity for policy reform 
that could boost municipal revenues and improve the relationship between 
local government and citizens. This is reflective of the experience of many 
cities across the world. For example, Lagos’ transformative infrastructure 
programmes over the last 20 years have been fundamentally underpinned 
by reforms to property tax compliance. 
This brief draws on economic research and international experiences to 
suggest possible routes through which Mandalay could improve property 
tax compliance. Such policy changes are predicated on strong foundations 
for tax administration, and in particular, the systems for property 
identification and assessment of tax obligations. These reforms to tax 
processes could generate big impact whilst also offering greater simplicity 
and political accecptability over other conventional approaches such as 
adjusting the rates that taxpayers face. 
Tax compliance and service delivery 
Two-thirds of Myanmar’s urban residents now report that they would 
be happy to pay more property taxes in return for improved local service 
delivery.1 Incremental tax compliance reforms are a key way to catalyse this 
process as they often represent a low-hanging fruit to increase property 
tax collection and are at the heart of the process whereby residents come 
to understand that property taxes are a legitimate price to pay for effective 
local services. Policies to increase tax compliance can broadly be divided 
into those that directly encourage compliance and those that penalise non-
compliance:
Increasing tax 
compliance
Encouraging 
compliance
Penalising non-
compliance
Increase perceived 
benefit of tax 
payment
Increase ease of 
tax payment
Local infrastructure 
investment & 
effective 
communication
Automate payment 
procedure
Legal penalties Social penalties
Audits; fines; 
withholding 
services
Publicise lists of 
non-payers
Policy Tools
Policy Aim
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Increasing the perceived benefits of tax 
payments
Policymakers can encourage compliance by increasing the perceived 
benefit of tax payment and by increasing the ease of tax payment. That is, 
taxpayers are far more likely to voluntarily comply with property taxes if 
they see them as the legitimate price paid for decent local public services. 
Two-thirds of urban residents in Myanmar have said they would be happy 
to pay more property tax if it meant better services for them and their 
city. To keep its side of this bargain, the MCDC needs to not only provide 
decent services but also needs to communicate to citizens that these 
services can only be provided if they pay their taxes.
Currently, many local urban governments in Myanmar struggle to 
effectively communicate to citizens how their taxes are used. Forty-five 
percent of urban residents do not even realise property taxes go to the 
local rather than the union government. Ninety percent say they would like 
more information on how their taxes are spent.2 In many cases, collection 
practices only serve to add to citizen’s lack of understanding. 
For example, currently many municipalities explicitly break up one 
‘property tax’ payment into four itemised payments (for land and 
buildings, street-lighting, water, and waste collection). However, the 
municipalities do not actually provide some of the associated services (e.g., 
waste collection) in return.3 Such discrepancies fundamentally undermine 
the link between property taxation and the local services needed to 
support high compliance.
One clear way to demonstrate the link between taxes and better service 
delivery is to hold public consultations on how people want their taxes 
spent. The government can then effectively communicate that taxes have 
been spent on public priorities, or if such communication fails, could 
even consider earmarking spending for particular public priorities. Lagos 
offers a useful case study of effective public participation and political 
communication to increase tax compliance.
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Case study: Communicating the link between tax and 
infrastructure in Lagos
In the 1990s, Lagos, the capital city of Nigeria, was internationally 
renowned for corruption, weak public infrastructure, low tax 
compliance, and an over-reliance on oil revenues. With the advent of 
democracy in 1999, Governor Babatunde Raji Fashola was elected 
Governor of Lagos State on a platform of tax reform and infrastructure 
delivery. Faced with limited central government transfers and a 
constituency demanding improvements, reforms started by streamlining 
and semi-privatising local property tax collection practices. 
The increased property tax revenues generated were spent on highly 
visible and popular infrastructure, such as roads. This was based on 
extensive public consultations revealing that, as one of the world’s most 
congested cities of the time, roads were the most pressing issue requiring 
state government attention. At the same time, the state government used 
innovative communication practices to demonstrate to citizens that 
roads could not have been built without their tax contributions. 
Between 1999 and 2011, Lagos State’s revenues from state-level taxes 
increased five-fold to over $1 billion. Capital spending increased from 
$600 million in 2006 to $1.7 billion in 2011. This represents a shift 
towards a higher tax, higher service delivery equilibrium. What’s more, 
Governor Fashola and his successor Bola Tinubu were both successfully 
re-elected based on popular support for the tax and infrastructure 
reforms. 
For property taxes in particular, tax payments can not only be linked to 
better infrastructure delivery, but also to more secure property rights. 
Property tax payments therefore become the legitimate price paid for 
both tenure security and local infrastructure delivery
In Lagos, physical road signs and social media campaigns have been used to 
sensitise citizens to the tangible benefits of  paying tax (Photo credit: EBS RCM 
Helpdesk, 2017).
4
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Improving the ease of tax payment
The current process for paying property tax in Mandalay is highly manual 
and labour- intensive. In each township, every six months 15-30 tax 
collectors go door to door in person, and collect payments on the spot in 
cash. If the payment is withheld or appealed, the tax collector may need to 
revisit the property multiple times throughout the year.5
There are certain advantages to this reliance on individual tax collectors: 
on-site visits can ease collection, and collectors’ familiarity with the 
local area can help identify properties that are not on cadastral records. 
However, notwithstanding the high staff costs in collection for MCDC, 
there are serious limitations involved with the current process:
• Taxpayers may face practical difficulties amassing cash on a particular 
payment day.
• Taxpayers have a strong incentive not to pay on collection day: If they 
don’t pay, the cost of a re-visit often exceeds the payment being collected, 
so it doesn’t happen. 
• Tax collectors can adjust the assessed tax to be collected, leaving room 
for corruption.
The ease of the taxpaying experience varies hugely depending on the 
tax collector involved. Since tax collectors do not receive formal training 
and largely learn by doing, this results in poor service in many areas. 
Furthermore, if collectors cannot explain tax payments effectively, this 
increases suspicions of corruption. A recent survey showed that 90% of 
Myanmar’s urban residents say they would like clearer information on 
which taxes they need to pay.6
These factors not only make the taxpaying process challenging, but also 
undermine the very legitimacy of the tax system itself. In other words, 
a poor tax payment system undermines not only the ease of payment, 
but also the perceived benefit of payment. In the short term, better 
training and performance-related incentives for tax collectors, as well as 
independent audits of assessed valuations, could go some way towards 
tackling these challenges. 
The MCDC has recognised that the tax payment system will ultimately 
need to become more automated to increase both ease and legitimacy. 
Four cities in Myanmar are currently piloting an automated tax billing 
and collection system, ‘Myankhon’. Initial findings suggest this has both 
increased revenues and reduced perceptions of corruption. Whilst this 
technological innovation is promising, as the case study of Kampala 
shows, automation can only be as effective as the staff who make the 
automated system work in practice.
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Case study: Revolutionising tax revenue collection in 
Kampala
The Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA) of Uganda has increased 
its own-source revenues by over 100% over the past four years. This 
has been achieved entirely through improving internal tax collection 
practices and without any national-level policy change. 
When the KCCA was created in 2011, to replace the Kampala City 
Council, the new Executive Director made revenue collection one of 
her top priorities. She created an independent Directorate of Revenue 
Collection (DRC), tasked with creating a collection system that ‘treats 
the taxpayer as a client’. To do this, the DRC created a new city-level 
taxpayer database, distinct from the incomplete national database. 
This database was then automated as part of a new electronic revenue 
management system, eCitie.
eCitie makes the tax payment process easy for both taxpayers and 
DRC staff. It automatically generates an account for each taxpayer 
and calculates the payments required for each account. Taxpayers can 
access their account via the internet or mobile phone at any time to 
understand the payments they need to make. Tax payments can be 
made through a number of convenient and traceable channels, including 
electronic transfer, cheque, mobile phone, or cash payments at the local 
bank. Partnerships with local banks and telecommunications operators 
have been developed to facilitate this. 
To enable better management of payments, eCitie also automatically 
generates receipts, sends out reminders to taxpayers, flags which 
taxpayers are in arrears, and generates management reports for the 
DRC. This has helped the KCCA to identify what revenue sources 
and which taxpayers are the most significant and enable effective 
prioritisation.
For the DRC to help design and operate eCitie effectively, it needed 
a critical mass of qualified staff. The new Executive Director of the 
KCCA had previously worked in the national Ugandan Revenue 
Authority and appointed a number of her previous colleagues to work 
with her in the new DRC. Previous staff also received intensive training. 
Currently, all DRC staff receive monthly training and refresher courses 
on tax, up-to-date tax laws, and operational guidelines. Salaries have 
increased to recruit and maintain high-calibre, well-trained staff, and 
diminish incentives for corruption.
Both eCitie and staff improvements have been enormously successful 
investments for the city. Collection costs have increased from roughly 
1% of tax collected in 2011 to 9% in 2015, however this has been more 
than off-set by an increase in own-source revenues of over 100% in the 
same period. The KCCA effectively receives a slightly smaller percentage 
of a much larger pie. Increased tax collection from the KCCA’s reforms 
have meant that the cost of staff and technology investments were 
largely recouped within only one year.
7
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Penalising non-compliance
Where non-compliance with tax obligations persists, MCDC currently 
relies on strict legal penalties such as fines and property seizures. Due to 
the limited credibility of these penalties, MCDC could consider more 
easily enforceable legal penalties or indeed social penalties for non-
compliance.
Legal penalties
Non-compliant taxpayers in Mandalay can be issued with fines. Over time, 
if the tax payment is still not made, the local government has the power 
to seize the property until arrears are settled. However, these powers are 
rarely exercised because such punishments involve complex and costly 
court proceedings which exceed the individual amount of tax being 
collected.
To avoid costly court proceedings for fines and property seizures, 
the MCDC could consider withholding services (e.g. infrastructure 
connections or land titling services) from noncompliant households. This 
is a practice regularly used by utility companies. It is important to note 
this is likely to be an unpopular policy if adopted in isolation – such a 
punishment may only be seen as legitimate if accompanied by efforts to 
ease and motivate tax payment.
Social penalties
Where legal penalties are difficult to enforce, local governments in many 
developing cities have found innovative ways to harness social pressures 
to make residents pay tax. A study in South Asia, for example, found 
that the government was able to increase VAT tax compliance by up to 
17% by publishing lists of firms who hadn’t paid their taxes.8 One way in 
which the MCDC could increase collection is by publicising similar lists 
within local communities of those who have not paid their property taxes, 
however, its important to ensure that transparency and equal treatment is 
applied to every non-complier to ensure that such a scheme is palatable to 
all citizens.
Notably, the study showed that this strategy only worked in areas where a 
significant number of firms (over 15%) were already paying taxes. In areas 
where non-compliance was the norm, lists of non-payers were unable to 
motivate a significant increase in tax payments. In areas where there is 
currently mass non-compliance, it may be more effective for the MCDC 
to publicise those who do pay their taxes: For example, the government 
of India has recently introduced personalised certificates to praise honest 
taxpayers.
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Improving the administrative foundations of 
property tax collection
As in many developing cities, administrative weaknesses in Mandalay 
make a reduced property tax intake a foregone conclusion. Many 
administrative functions are done manually rather than being automated 
and decentralised, which means crucial elements of the tax system – such 
as cadastral maps and valuation rolls – are often incomplete and out 
of date. These deficiencies constrain property tax collection from the 
outset: the total revenue potential already misses a broad base of taxable 
properties and at the same time valuation deficiencies impede the accurate 
setting of tax rates. 
To facilitate more effective property tax collection there are three 
administrative foundations that MCDC may need to focus on as a starting 
point:
1. Identification of taxable properties
2. Preparation of an up-to-date valuation roll
3. Establishing integrated land management systems
Identification of taxable properties 
The first step towards levying a property tax is to establish an inventory of 
all properties and their liable taxpayers. Countries where property-related 
information is inaccurate or difficult to access are destined to struggle with 
low compliance and collection.9
In Myanmar, property identification is based on cadastral maps that are 
typically very old and in poor condition. Records tend to be paper-based 
and incomplete, making them susceptible to tampering, damage, loss, or 
general discrepancies across the registry. Paper records also make it very 
difficult for tax collectors to add properties that are not currently on the 
register or to update records to reflect changes in property and ownership 
characteristics.¹0
As a result, a substantial number of properties are either not paying 
the correct amount of property tax or not paying property tax at 
all.¹¹ Moreover, even when properties are well-identified, there is often 
ambiguity over who is liable to pay the charge – whether it should be the 
registered owner or the occupier who pays and whether certain properties, 
owners or tenants are suitable for exemptions. These ambiguities lead 
to missed payments and disputes which end up costing the municipality 
valuable resources. 
Problems in the property tax system can often be traced back to 
weaknesses in the identification of properties. Hence, improving the 
cadastral system should be a foundational element of property tax reform 
in Myanmar. As the case study of Rwanda shows, there are quick and cost-
effective ways to achieve comprehensive identification and registration of 
property.
“Countries where property-related 
information is inaccurate or 
difficult to access are destined to 
struggle with low compliance and 
collection.”
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The Rwanda case study shows how innovative approaches can be used to 
revamp cadasters using only a fraction of time and resources typically used 
elsewhere. This identification not only brings more properties into the tax 
net, but crucially, the unique property identification number can be linked 
with subsequent property-related actions such as tax assessments, billing, 
and transfer of title deeds.¹7 This  allows city authorities to assess and 
review their tax policies, ultimately enhancing their potential resources 
and laying the foundations for more informed policy decisions.
Below we provide further detail on the issuance and allocation of taxpayer 
identification numbers (TIN) and the critical role they play in successful 
tax administration. 
Case study: Rwanda’s quick and cost-effective 
approach to parcel identification
Between 2009 and 2013, Rwanda became the first country in Africa to 
establish a complete and fully digital legal cadaster.¹² Two aspects of the 
program make the case study of compelling interest: the relatively short 
time that was required to go from initial implementation to delivery, in 
just five years the government systematically demarcated and registered 
over 11 million parcels, and the delivery at a low cost of $6 per parcel, 
well below international averages – for comparison: In Tanzania, 
complex surveying processes inflate titling costs to over $3,000 for an 
individual land parcel.¹³ 
The program’s success stemmed from combining local consultations 
and communication campaigns with wide-scale and low cost 
technologies for mapping and surveying of plots. Instead of using 
highly trained professional cadastral surveyors, local para-surveyors 
demarcated plot boundaries using simple methods of boundary 
demarcation in the presence of the whole community, and plots were 
then recorded using satellite and aerial photographs¹4. 
Each parcel could then be unambiguously identified and mapped 
through a unique parcel identifier (UPI). This UPI can be digitally 
linked to the registry and other government services. To date, the UPI 
has not been used for tax purposes, however, there is no doubt that 
it offers great potential to facilitate and review Rwanda’s property 
tax administration. For example, a recent World Bank study used the 
UPIs to impute different outcomes that would arise under alternative 
approaches to taxing  residential land and property in Kigali.¹5 The 
authors show that the government could yield a tenfold increase over its 
current revenue from public land if it were to apply a 1% flat rate fee as 
opposed to the current system of lease fees.¹6
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Taxpayer identification numbers
Without Taxpayer Identification Numbers (TIN), it is very difficult to 
track taxpayers and make use of information for the assessment and 
billing of tax obligations. Many countries opt for a single TIN – issued at 
the individual taxpayer level to encompass all taxes – on the premise that a 
single and unique identifier simplifies the ease of payment and monitoring 
of compliance. 
However, some countries may choose to issue multiple, separate TINs 
for different types of taxes. This may be useful where different taxes are 
administered by separate departments or where certain taxes demand 
different treatment of taxpayer information. For instance, properties may 
be assigned unique property identifiers that can be associated with the 
public cadastral records and the title deed, while an individual’s income 
tax number may need to remain confidential to protect the taxpayer. The 
key matter is that all TINs are able to map back to a single, unique TIN 
which tallies the total obligations for each individual taxpayer.¹8
Practically speaking, having multiple TINs increases the administrative 
requirements of tax authorities. It also makes the system more 
vulnerable to potential error and fraud. Ensuring that multiple TINs 
can be successfully used requires strong coordination between different 
departments administering separate taxes. These requirements mean 
computer-aided systems are practically an essential to streamline the 
coordination, monitoring, and issuance of taxpayer identification numbers 
across the tax system, but again, as the Kampala case shows, automation 
needs to be combined with training for public administrators. 
Another equally important matter – that becomes particularly relevant 
when multiple TINs are issued to taxpayers – is that administrative 
departments take measures to ensure there is no duplication of TINs: 
no TIN is assigned to more than one taxpayer and that no taxpayer is 
assigned more than one TIN. For example, when the National Board 
of Revenue in Bangladesh reviewed its taxpayer registry in 2013, they 
discovered that of the existing 3 million taxpayers registered with TINs, 
1.2 million were either fake or duplicated – allowing opportunities 
for widespread avoidance of tax obligations.¹9 Similar issues exist in 
Myanmar, where it has been suggested that some property owners avoid 
paying taxes by creating duplicate sale contracts: one recording the actual 
transaction and a dummy to be submitted for tax purposes.²0 
Preparation of an up-to-date valuation roll 
Fair and efficient property tax systems not only require a good basis for 
initial identification and inventory of properties but they also require 
systems for valuation and revaluation of the asset and its associated 
characteristics. As in many developing countries, valuation methods in 
Myanmar are often unable to accurately capture a significant share of the 
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variation in land and property values. The formulas to calculate property 
tax obligations are often based on quite basic characteristics to proxy 
property values – such as the number of storeys and material make-up of 
buildings – which in turn often make these formulaic values substantially 
different from the true value of the property in question.2¹
Another issue with the formula based approach to valuation that 
Mandalay currently uses is that in an attempt to build fairness into the 
calculation of rates, the municipality incorporates a vast array of variables 
to determine the tax bands in which each property falls. Paradoxically, 
this tends to overcomplicate the process, leading to larger administrative 
burdens and increased timeframes to carry-out property assessments. 
Valuations are relatively infrequent as a result, thus decreasing the 
legitimacy of the tax and leaving taxayers susceptible to sudden, dramatic 
shifts in tax burdens as and when reassessments of property values occur. 
These issues highlight a common trade off that municipalities face when 
choosing how best to value land, the trade off between greater accuracy 
and greater simplicity. We summarise some of these trade offs in the table 
below which compares several different categories for property valuation 
that are commonly used by international standards. Each cell in the table 
indicates the relative performance of each tax category against a certain 
criteria, highlighting in red areas where the taxes are very costly, orange 
where they are medium, and green where they perform relatively well. This 
table and subsequent information for this section is taken from an IGC 
policy paper on Land and property taxes for municipal finance so we refer 
the reader there for a more detailed review of common tax approaches.²²
Type of 
assessment
Accuracy
Data 
requirements 
on 
transactions
Data 
requirements 
on land 
contents/
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Estimation 
capacity 
required
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High – though 
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transactions)
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Significant Can be low
Rental Value
High (where 
rental values 
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and rent 
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Significant 
(on rental 
transactions)
High for greater 
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Significant Can be low
Points/Proxy
Medium 
(depending on 
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None needed 
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in accuracy
Depends on 
number of 
proxies
Medium Relatively high
Area-based Low None Very limited Limited High
Construction 
cost
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supply side 
transactions
High High Relatively high
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As the above table indicates, market value assessments, which include 
capital market and rental value assesments, are comparatively highly 
accurate. These tend to be the ‘gold standard’ used by developed cities. 
However, they require a significant amount of data to accurately measure 
current values of properties in any systematic way, often beyond the 
resource capacities of developing cities. 
A more feasible option for developing cities might be more akin to a 
reasonable value approach – which has been used historically in developed 
countries such as the USA and Canada. An example of this would be to 
update the valuation of a property to reflect the sale price of the property 
every time it changes hands, or to use similar property sales in the same 
network to estimate what you think the property would sell for, were it 
to be listed. This shares the intention of market-based approaches in that 
property values are estimated base on previous or similar transactions, 
however, it involves more informal subjective judgement rather than more 
rigorous computer-aided appraisal. The advantage is it offers a quick and 
convenient method for valuation, however, its important to note that it is 
still only effective insofar as there is a reasoanably dynamic and liquid real 
estate market that values property sales relatively effectively.
Other commonly used assessment methods in developing cities include 
area-based assessments as these typically only require a small number 
of variables that cover information on the size, location, and quality 
of structures. This method is most closely related to Mandalay’s 
current system, however, one of the main benefits of an area-based 
approach is that it typically does not require too much data on property 
characteristics, meaning the estimation process is not overly burdensome 
and can be easily communicated to the public. The complexity of 
Mandalay’s current calculation methods may therefore detract from the 
typical benefits that area-based assessments offer. 
Finally, points-based valuation systems offer a hybrid ground between 
more complex value-based versus area-based assessments. In these 
approaches, points are assigned to various positive and negative observable 
characteristics of land and property in order to generate a proxy for 
property values that can be used for taxation. Implementing a points 
based system allowed local authorities in Sierra Leone to increase revenues 
between 200 – 450% from 2007-20111, and these systems are now being 
developed in other cities such as Kampala.
When considering how best to value land and property in Mandalay, it’s 
important to pay close attention to these accuracy-simplicity trade offs 
so that tax revenues can be adjusted and scaled appropriately to match 
the level of urban development. Although market based assessments 
may be closer to the true value of property, they require large data and 
administrative resources. Simpler valuation schemes not only reduce these 
costs but come with the advantage that they can be more transparent and 
easily communicated to taxpayers, thus encouraging greater compliance.
“Implementing a points based 
system allowed local authorities 
in Sierra Leone to increase reve-
nues between 200 – 450% from 
2007-2011.”
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Establishing integrated land management systems
The information to support a property tax system is often held by different 
agencies across central and local government. To ensure the system can be 
efficient, measures need to be taken to collect and share information in a 
consistent way across departments. 
In Myanmar, municipal tax administrators routinely struggle to get hold 
of the information they need to register properties and levy an appropriate 
tax. To give an example, when there is a transfer of property ownership in 
Myanmar, the sale contract is signed off by the Land Record Department 
and Ward Administrator, but the information is not shared automatically 
with the municipality for tax purposes.²4 Instead, it is deemed the 
responsibility of the property owner to self-register with the municipality, 
and they face little incentive to declare themselves onto the radar of tax 
authorities.²5
To improve the sharing of information and coordination of land 
management, the Mandalay authorities may look to instigate new 
guidelines or legislation for data management at the municipal level, or 
alternatively, they could pressure regional and national authorities to do 
so at a wider scale. Such frameworks may look to ensure data collection 
efforts are standardised and compliant with consistent methodologies 
used across and between local and national governments. This can 
ensure that data can be utilised and compared by multiple stakeholders. 
Legislation and guidelines could also play an important role in facilitating 
more evidence-based policymaking in general. Perhaps through outlining 
specific data that all municipalities should collect on a regular basis to be 
able to understand the growth and the needs of the city population. 
Adopting new technology could also streamline the structure and 
management of tax administration in Mandalay. Computer-aided 
systems could help to enhance communication links between government 
departments as well as customer relations. Such policy changes would 
lessen the face-to-face approach to tax collection currently in place in 
Mandalay, therefore offering the potential to reduce corruption and error 
that stems from personalised interaction between taxpayers and collectors. 
The Myankhon application that has been integrated to tax collection in 
Taunggyi could be an important example for Mandalay to learn from. 
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Case study: A tech-savvy tax administration platform 
for Taunggyi
In just over a year, the city of Taunggyi in Myanmar was able to reduce 
the time taken to complete property tax collection by three-fold thanks 
to the introduction of a new mobile application called Myankhon in 
October 2016.26 Myankhon allows municipal staff to manage all aspects 
of tax administration digitally. Before it was introduced, tax collectors 
would have to sift through endless paper records, often taking as long as 
six months to complete their assessments.²7 However, since the launch 
of the app, there has been widespread digitisation of cadastral records 
helping to automate the calculation of bills and streamline the overall 
efficiency of property tax administration. 
The new digital platform also means that municipal authorities can 
now review and analyse larger quantities of property and tax data in 
real time and in ways that would not be possible with paper records. 
These improvements in data and research potential are helping their 
understanding of the urbanisation process and how they can use 
evidence to evaluate the merit of different policy options.
The pilot of Myankhon shows that digital platforms can generate 
practical administrative and policy-relevant advantages for property 
taxation. Moreover, it could be a valuable technological innovation that 
could be rolled-out across other municipalities in Myanmar.  With more 
widespread digital record keeping, there could be further improvements 
in efficiency – such as consolidated record keeping at the regional level 
and more automated billing procedures.
Municipal staff  in Taunggyi use Myankhon. Before the app, property tax collection in the city took 
nearly six months to finish, now it takes two months with barely any paperwork.
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In summary
There are a number of tools at the disposal of MCDC to increase 
property tax compliance. For example, future policy could use public 
communication as a means to foster a more positive image of tax 
collection, encouraging citizens to recognise it as a social obligation 
and legitimate price to pay in return for public services. Another way 
to encourage tax compliance would be to increase the ease of payment 
through reorganising the current system from a personalised and 
manually-intensive collection process to one that can be done at the 
convenience of the taxpayer. Where non-compliance persists, MCDC 
should also consider more easily enforceable approaches for penalisation, 
reducing the legal and administrative complexity of the current system. 
The most appropriate way forward would likely encompass some 
combination of all these approaches. However, they are only likely 
to be successful insofar as they are based on a strong foundations of 
identification, valuation, and management in tax administration. These 
foundations are not only critical for effective collection and enforcement 
of property taxation, but they also form an essential pillar for generating 
support for taxation, which becomes much more likely when taxpayers 
perceive government administration to be a well-oiled machine.
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